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dc.contributor.authorOnebunne, Charles Kosolu-
dc.date.accessioned2026-09-10T07:11:31Z-
dc.date.available2026-09-10T07:11:31Z-
dc.date.issued2026-
dc.identifier.citationMULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF LAW, EDUCATION AND HUMANITIES (MJLEH) VOL 3 NO. 2,en_US
dc.identifier.issnP: 3043-6435; E: 3043-6486-
dc.identifier.urihttps://nigerianjournalsonline.org-
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.unizik.edu.ng/handle/123456789/1340-
dc.descriptionScholarly worken_US
dc.description.abstractFrom the last quarter of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century, scientists and philosophers of science have debated the role of observation in theory formation. Specifically, the debate is between two dominant and competing traditions: inductivism and falsificationism. On the one hand, the inductivists argue that observation constitutes the starting point of science and that general laws are derived from repeated empirical observation through inductive reasoning. On the other hand, the falsificationists, associated with Karl Popper, reject inductivism arguing that scientific observations are theory-laden and that general laws are tested deductively with the aim of refuting them. Using library research and logical analysis, this study revisits the inductivist-falsificatinist debate on the role of observation in theory formation. The study found that both positions, though influential represent incomplete accounts of scientific practice. The inductivists’ position is undermined by the problem of induction, the theory-laden nature of observation, and the logical impossibility of deriving universal laws from particular instances. Falsificationists' position, though methodologically rigorous, fails to reflect the actual practice of science, where theories are rarely abandoned in the face of anomalies but often protected by ad hoc hypotheses. Based on this, the study argues that observation does not act as a neutral foundation for theory formation but operates within conceptual and theoretical frameworks that shapes its meaning and interpretation. The study concludes that scientific progress is better explained as a dynamic and interactive process involving the interaction of observation, theoretical imagination, hypothesis construction, and critical testing. Therefore, neither pure inductivism nor strict falsificationism adequately explains scientific theory formation. Instead scientific knowledge emerges from the continuous interplay between empirical evidence and theoretical creativity, underscoring the indispensable but non-autonomous role of observation in scientific inquiry.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherMULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF LAW, EDUCATION AND HUMANITIES (MJLEH)en_US
dc.subjectObservationen_US
dc.subjecttheory formationen_US
dc.subjectInductivismen_US
dc.subjectFalsificationismen_US
dc.subjectScientific Methoden_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.titleTHE ROLE OF OBSERVATION IN THEORY FORMATION IN SCIENCEen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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