PROBLEM-SOLVING AS THE CATALYST FOR SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

Abstract

Almost every scholar today agrees that modern science makes progress. This is obvious in the remarkable technological and theoretical achievements recorded by modern science throughout its history. However, difficulty arises when it comes to explaining in both ontological and epistemological terms what constitutes scientific progress and how it should be evaluated. Regarding this, philosophers of science are broadly divided into two categories, namely; the rationalists who argue that truth is the ultimate aim of science and that scientific progress is measured in terms of increasing verisimilitude, and the pragmatists, who argue that progress should be evaluated according to the problem-solving effectiveness of scientific theories. Using the method of conceptual analysis and library research, this paper examines this debate through the philosophical frameworks of Karl Popper and Larry Laudan. While Popper conceives science as an unending quest for truth and identifies verisimilitude as the criterion of scientific progress, Laudan argues that truth is not a measurable standard and therefore proposes problem-solving as a more practical criterion for evaluating scientific progress. This paper argues that despite their laudable insights, both philosophers offer only partial accounts of scientific progress. Popper emphasizes the teleological aim of science while giving insufficient attention to the practical criterion by which scientific progresss is assessed, while Laudan develops a compelling criterion of evaluation without adequately accounting for the ultimate end of the scientific enterprise. In this regard, the paper contends that the apparent disagreement between Popper and Laudan is mainly one of emphasis rather than outright opposition. Popper addressed the teleological question of why science is pursued, identifying truth as the ultimate end, whereas Laudan addresses the epistemological question of how scientific progress is recognized and evaluated, identifying problem-solving effectiveness as the most reliable criterion. Properly understood, these two perspectives are two sides of the same coin and are therefore complementary rather than incompatible.